Byoungyoung Lee works at Seoul National University.

Posts

VESSELS: Efficient and Scalable Deep Learning Prediction on Trusted Processors

VESSELS: Efficient and Scalable Deep Learning Prediction on Trusted Processors Deep learning systems on the cloud are increasingly targeted by attacks that attempt to steal sensitive data. Intel SGX has been proven effective to protect the confidentiality and integrity of such data during computation. However, state-of-the-art SGX systems still suffer from substantial performance overhead induced by the limited physical memory of SGX. This limitation significantly undermines the usability of deep learning systems due to their memory-intensive characteristics.In this paper, we provide a systematic study on the inefficiency of the existing SGX systems for deep learning prediction with a focus on their memory usage. Our study has revealed two causes of the inefficiency in the current memory usage paradigm: large memory allocation and low memory reusability. Based on this insight, we present Vessels, a new system that addresses the inefficiency and overcomes the limitation on SGX memory through memory usage optimization techniques. Vessels identifies the memory allocation and usage patterns of a deep learning program through model analysis and creates a trusted execution environment with an optimized memory pool, which minimizes the memory footprint with high memory reusability. Our experiments demonstrate that, by significantly reducing the memory footprint and carefully scheduling the workloads, Vessels can achieve highly efficient and scalable deep learning prediction while providing strong data confidentiality and integrity with SGX.

PoLPer: Process-Aware Restriction of Over-Privileged Setuid Calls in Legacy Applications

PoLPer: Process-Aware Restriction of Over-Privileged Setuid Calls in Legacy Applications Setuid system calls enable critical functions such as user authentications and modular privileged components. Such operations must only be executed after careful validation. However, current systems do not perform rigorous checks, allowing exploitation of privileges through memory corruption vulnerabilities in privileged programs. As a solution, understanding which setuid system calls can be invoked in what context of a process allows precise enforcement of least privileges. We propose a novel comprehensive method to systematically extract and enforce least privilege of setuid system calls to prevent misuse. Our approach learns the required process contexts of setuid system calls along multiple dimensions: process hierarchy, call stack, and parameter in a process-aware way. Every setuid system call is then restricted to the per-process context by our kernel-level context enforcer. Previous approaches without process-awareness are too coarse-grained to control setuid system calls, resulting in over-privilege. Our method reduces available privileges even for identical code depending on whether it is run by a parent or a child process. We present our prototype called PoLPer which systematically discovers only required setuid system calls and effectively prevents real-world exploits targeting vulnerabilities of the setuid family of system calls in popular desktop and server software at near zero overhead.