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Chung Hwan Kim is a former Researcher in the Data Science & System Security department at NEC Laboratories America, Inc.

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VESSELS: Efficient and Scalable Deep Learning Prediction on Trusted Processors

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Deep learning systems on the cloud are increasingly targeted by attacks that attempt to steal sensitive data. Intel SGX has been proven effective to protect the confidentiality and integrity of such data during computation. However, state-of-the-art SGX systems still suffer from substantial performance overhead induced by the limited physical memory of SGX. This limitation significantly undermines the usability of deep learning systems due to their memory-intensive characteristics.In this paper, we provide a systematic study on the inefficiency of the existing SGX systems for deep learning prediction with a focus on their memory usage. Our study has revealed two causes of the inefficiency in the current memory usage paradigm: large memory allocation and low memory reusability. Based on this insight, we present Vessels, a new system that addresses the inefficiency and overcomes the limitation on SGX memory through memory usage optimization techniques. Vessels identifies the memory allocation and usage patterns of a deep learning program through model analysis and creates a trusted execution environment with an optimized memory pool, which minimizes the memory footprint with high memory reusability. Our experiments demonstrate that, by significantly reducing the memory footprint and carefully scheduling the workloads, Vessels can achieve highly efficient and scalable deep learning prediction while providing strong data confidentiality and integrity with SGX.

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Progressive Processing of System-Behavioral Query

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System monitoring has recently emerged as an effective way to analyze and counter advanced cyber attacks. The monitoring data records a series of system events and provides a global view of system behaviors in an organization. Querying such data to identify potential system risks and malicious behaviors helps security analysts detect and analyze abnormal system behaviors caused by attacks. However, since the data volume is huge, queries could easily run for a long time, making it difficult for system experts to obtain prompt and continuous feedback. To support interactive querying over system monitoring data, we propose ProbeQ, a system that progressively processes system-behavioral queries. It allows users to concisely compose queries that describe system behaviors and specify an update frequency to obtain partial results progressively. The query engine of ProbeQ is built based on a framework that partitions ProbeQ queries into sub-queries for parallel execution and retrieves partial results periodically based on the specified update frequency. We concretize the framework with three partition strategies that predict the workloads for sub-queries, where the adaptive workload partition strategy (AdWd) dynamically adjusts the predicted workloads for subsequent sub-queries based on the latest execution information. We evaluate the prototype system of ProbeQ on commonly used queries for suspicious behaviors over real-world system monitoring data, and the results show that the ProbeQ system can provide partial updates progressively (on average 9.1% deviation from the update frequencies) with only 1.2% execution overhead compared to the execution without progressive processing.

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PoLPer: Process-Aware Restriction of Over-Privileged Setuid Calls in Legacy Applications

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Setuid system calls enable critical functions such as user authentications and modular privileged components. Such operations must only be executed after careful validation. However, current systems do not perform rigorous checks, allowing exploitation of privileges through memory corruption vulnerabilities in privileged programs. As a solution, understanding which setuid system calls can be invoked in what context of a process allows precise enforcement of least privileges. We propose a novel comprehensive method to systematically extract and enforce least privilege of setuid system calls to prevent misuse. Our approach learns the required process contexts of setuid system calls along multiple dimensions: process hierarchy, call stack, and parameter in a process-aware way. Every setuid system call is then restricted to the per-process context by our kernel-level context enforcer. Previous approaches without process-awareness are too coarse-grained to control setuid system calls, resulting in over-privilege. Our method reduces available privileges even for identical code depending on whether it is run by a parent or a child process. We present our prototype called PoLPer which systematically discovers only required setuid system calls and effectively prevents real-world exploits targeting vulnerabilities of the setuid family of system calls in popular desktop and server software at near zero overhead.

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SAQL: A Stream-based Query System for Real-Time Abnormal System Behavior Detection

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Recently, advanced cyber attacks, which consist of a sequence of steps that involve many vulnerabilities and hosts, compromise the security of many well-protected businesses. This has led to solutions that ubiquitously monitor system activities in each host (big data) as a series of events and search for anomalies (abnormal behaviors) for triaging risky events. Since fighting against these attacks is a time-critical mission to prevent further damage, these solutions face challenges in incorporating expert knowledge to perform timely anomaly detection over the large-scale provenance data. To address these challenges, we propose a novel stream-based query system that takes as input, a real-time event feed aggregated from multiple hosts in an enterprise, and provides an anomaly query engine that queries the event feed to identify abnormal behaviors based on the specified anomalies. To facilitate the task of expressing anomalies based on expert knowledge, our system provides a domain-specific query language, SAQL, which allows analysts to express models for (1) rule-based anomalies, (2) time-series anomalies, (3) invariant-based anomalies, and (4) outlier-based anomalies. We deployed our system in NEC Labs America, comprising 150 hosts, and evaluated it using 1.1TB of real system monitoring data (containing 3.3 billion events). Our evaluations on a broad set of attack behaviors and micro-benchmarks show that our system has a low detection latency (<2s) and a high system throughput (110,000 events/s; supporting ~4000 hosts), and is more efficient in memory utilization than the existing stream-based complex event processing systems.

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